From 2/25: Transcendental Idealism

Now that we've taken our first - and rather large - step into Kant's metaphysics, it should prove helpful to reflect on Kant's overall project. Is synthetic a priori knowledge really possible? Is his response to Hume adequate? Is he right to think of philosophy as a critique (or reigning in) of reason? And finally, is the world really something of our own, mental making? Much to think about here - perhaps enough to force us out of bed at 4:55 every morning!

For 2/25: Kant's Prolegomena, Preface & Preamble

From Cartesian Rationalism and Humean Empiricism, we now move to the Transcendental Idealism of Immanuel Kant. In reading the beginning of the Prolegomena, what do you make of Kant's project? What seems to be his main objective? Can you make sense of where he disagrees with Hume? And what's the big deal with synthetic a priori propositions? Though Kant is by no means an easy read, if we first see what he wants to do, we should be able to get a pretty good handle on Kant's philosophy as a whole.

From 2/18: Liberty, Miracles, & The Afterlife

In finishing up Hume on Wednesday night, we touched on many topics: Are liberty and necessity mutually exclusive? Are miracles likley -- or even possible? Can we know anything about God or an afterlife based on our own experience? Much to think about how here, including how Hume's scepticism contrasts with Descartes'. Before we move onto Kant, here's another chance to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of Hume.

For 2/18: Hume's Enquiry, Sections VIII-XII

Being ever skeptical of metaphysical doctrines and absolute declarations, Hume deals with a number of traditional philosophical questions in the second half of his Enquiry. Can liberty and necessity be reconciled with each other? Are we really so different from animals? What do we make of miracles (such as the parting of the Red Sea)? Where do we see divine providence? Is our belief in a future state justified? In considering Hume's answer to these assorted questions, be sure to share your own insights as well.

From 2/11: Customary Conjunction

Moving away from the rationalism of Descartes, we have now ventured into the empiricism of Hume. Rather than questioniong the senses, Hume feels that human understanding can begin in no other place. Unlike Descartes, Hume is suspicious of the powers of the mind, arguing that we only imagine necessary connections between causes and effects when in fact there are only customary conjunctions whereby certain events tend to coincide. Is this a more honest treatment of human knowledge? Can the mind really know nothing without the senses? Does a certain relativism creep in here? As Hume might say, look to your own experience!

For 2/11: Hume's Enquiry, Sections I-VII

Switching gears from rationalism to empiricism, we come to the Scottish philosopher David Hume. Whereas Descartes (as we have seen) has a general distrust of his own experience and senses, Hume says that - trust them or not - human understanding would be impossible without them. Knowledge, in other words, is not innate, but builds up over time through our own experiences. Further, since these experiences are necessarily limited, so too is the knowledge we gain from them. So, is this a fair assessment of how the human mind works or might we take issue with Hume as well?

From 2/4: Bringing back the World

By the end of the Meditations, Descartes fully restores the world which he originally brought into doubt. But what sort of world is this? It's one where mathematics is now the language of nature, where our senses are only to be trusted if they provide clear and distinct ideas, and where we are essentially our minds -- minds which are somehow "commingled" with our bodies. So what do we make of this Cartesian world? Has he adequately accounted for it or is there a certain madness to his method? And how close is this to depicting the world as we understand it today?

For 2/4: Descartes' Mediations IV-VI

Now that Descartes has established his own existence as a thinking thing as well as the existence of God as infinite substance, he must now try to bring back the physical world whose very existence he called into question in Meditation I. Is he able to topple his own dream argument here? Can he ever come to trust his senses again? And what of his own body? Does it really belong to him and, if so, what is its relation to his mind? Also, if you ever wondered what a chiliagon (a thousand-sided polygon) looks like, here's a drawing of what Descartes could understand but not imagine.